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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- vs -
JACK SYDDALL, JIMMIE JONES, and 
KENNETH PERRY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 
10953 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellants, Jack Syddall, Jimmie Jones, and 
Kenneth Perry, were charged with the crime of 
burglary in the first degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellants were charged in city court and 
bound over to the district court for trial. Jury was had 
in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis 
County on the 21st through 23rd of March, 1967, the 
Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge, presiding. At 
the close of the State's case in chief, the trial court 
granted defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of 
burglary in the first degree, but a motion on behalf 
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of defendants to dismiss the included offenses was 
denied. The jury found each of the defendants guil-
ty of the crime of burglary in the second degree. On 
March 31, 1967, the defendants, and each of them 
I 
were sentenced to the Utah State Prison to serve for 
the indeterminate period provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the conviction should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is substantially in agreement with 
the statement of facts as set out in appellants' brief. 
However, certain improper inferences are drawn 
from the facts stated in the record. Appellant claims 
that the record clearly indicates that defendants had 
no interest in taking anything from the Lockhart 
Company (Brief of Appellant, page 3). Respondent 
submits that a more accurate statement under the 
facts revealed in the record is that the record clear-
ly indicated that, prior to their apprehension, appel-
lants had taken nothing from the Lockhart Company. 
Furthermore, the appellants allege that a small vault 
that was inside the Lockhart Company was ignored. 
The answer here again is that the vault was ignored 
up to the time of their apprehension. In view of the 
mass of evidence which by appellants' own admis-
sion proves that they were perpetrating a felony, 
(Brief of Appellants, p. 4), it is wholly unreasonable 
to attribute to these appellants an absence of felon-
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ious intent coexistent with the breaking and enter-
ing of both Barlow Furniture Company and the 
Lockhart Company. 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS WERE AFFORDED AN ADEQUATE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING AND HAD SUFFICIENT 
NOTICE OF THE CRIME OF WHICH THEY WERE 
ULTIMATELY CONVICTED. 
Appellants apparently would argue that some 
vague impropriety at the preliminary hearing result-
ed in their not having notice of the crime of which 
they were ultimately convicted. Respondent submits 
that this argument is without merit. There had al-
ready been two preliminary hearings in this matter 
(R. 73 P. 6). At the hearing on the State's motion to 
amend the information, the objection was made by 
defendants that the amendment to the information 
would constitute a change in substance and appar-
ently would prejudice the defendants. The follow-
ing colloquy then took place between the court and 
counsel for defendants: 
COURT: 
The record may note the objection, Mr. King. 
And if there is sufficient concern about a 
change in the substance of the crime, or the 
substance of the evidence as it applies and the 
allegation as it now reads, it may be that the 
matter should be remanded for a further pre-
liminary hearing. The court would leave that 
course open to the defendants, if you desire to 
make such a motion, and will allow you five 
days to make the motion. 
MR. KING: 
There having already been two preliminary 
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hearing, as I understand, based on that speci-
fic point, I don't think the defendants should 
be obligated to incur the time and expense of 
another preliminary hearing. So we will make 
no further request for further preliminary 
hearing, and are prepared at this time to ask 
for a trial setting. [R.73 P.6] 
From the foregoing, it is clear that defendants 
apparently did not feel that the change or the alleg-
ed variance in the information was so gross as to 
deprive them of notice of the crime of which they 
were charged. As the above exchange discloses, the 
court offered ample opportunity for defendants to 
have a further preliminary hearing and thus apprise 
themselves of the nature of the charge. The defend-
ants' refusal to avail themselves thereof necessarily 
indicates that they were fully aware of the nature of 
the charge and that the objection was frivolous. It is 
submitted that defendants' request to proceed with 
the trial setting at that time was an absolute waiver 
of any objection based on an impropriety at the 
preliminary hearing or in the information. Thus, ap-
pellants cannot claim at this point that the court's 
action, in which they acquiesced, was prejudicial to 
them. 
POINT II 
THE OVERWHELMING MASS OF INCRIMINATING 
EVIDENCE IS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT A CONVICTION OF SECOND DEGREE BURG-
LARY OF THE BARLOW FURNITURE COMPANY AND 
THE LOCKHART COMPANY. 
The crime of burglary is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-3 (1953), which, in part provides: 
---
) 
I 
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Every person who, in the nighttime, forcibly breaks 
and enters ... any house, room, apartment, tene-
ment, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, out-
house or other building ... with intent to commit 
larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the 
second degree. [Emphasis Added]. 
The rule of law applicable in this and in other 
jurisdictions having similar statutes1 is that the mere 
unauthorized entry in the nighttime of a dwelling 
house or other building of another provides the jury 
w] th sufficient evidence to infer the intent element, 
and will warrant a conviction of second degree 
burglary; there is no requirement that a theft must 
be proven. See, e. g., State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 
363, 359 P.2d 486 (1961); State v. Winters, 54 Wash. 
2d 707, 344 P.2d 526 (1959) (Statutory presumption 
that entry was for criminal purpose); People v. Mur-
phy, 173 Cal. App. 2d 367, 343 P.2d 273 (1959); People 
v. Guarino, 132 Cal. App. 2d 554, 282 P.2d 538 (1955); 
State v. Tellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 324 P.2d 490 (l 958);Ex 
parte Seyfried, 74 Idaho 467, 264 P.2d 685 (1953). 
As was stated in State v. Tellay, supra at 309, 
324 P.2d at 490-491: 
1 Cal. Crim. Code § 459. "Every person who enters any [of the enumerated 
enclosures] with the intent to commit grand or petit larcency or any 
felony is guilty of burglary." 
Idaho Code § 18-1401 (Supp. 1965). "Every person who enters any[of the 
enumerated enclosures] with intent to commit grand or petit larceny 
or any felony, is guilty of burglary." 
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.19.020 (Sept. 1956). "Every person who, with intent 
to commit some crime therein shall ... enter ... or break and enter 
. . . any building or part thereof ... is guilty of burglary in the second 
degree .... " 
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It is appellants' contention that as a matter of law 
there was insufficient evidence to convict appellant 
of burglary because it was not directly proved that 
he had the intent to commit larceny or any other 
felony, and since nothing was found missing or sto-
len from the building, the jury could reasonably 
find, especially in view of his drinking, that he had 
entered for an innocent purpose. The answer to that 
is that the jury did not so find. Nor can it be said 
as a matter of law that from all the facts and circ-
umstances in this case a jury could not reasonably 
find beyond a reasonable doubt the necessary in-
tent to commit larceny or any other felony. [Em-
phasis Added]. 
Thus it is clear that the mere fact that appellants 
had entered the building in question during the 
nighttime would support and justify a jury verdict 
of guilty. Moreover, it is significant that our statute 
does not require, nor do the similar statutes of sister 
jurisdictions require, that the entry be made with a 
concomitant intent to commit a felony within the 
building entered. Ariz. Rev, Stat. Ann.§ 13-302 (1956); 
Cal. Crim. Code § 459; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-5 
(1964); Idaho Code§ 18-1401 (Supp. 1965); Mont. Rev. 
Code Ann. § 94-901 (Supp. 1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 
205.060 (1959). Contra, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.19.020 
(Sept. 1956). Respondent submits that the proscrip-
tion of the statute is designed to encompass the un-
lawful entry of a building in the nightime for the 
purpose of using the entered building to directly 
further the perpetration of a felony. People v. Wright, 
--
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206 Cal. App. 2d 184, 23 Cal Rptr. 734 (1962)2• 
State v. Charette. 98 N.H. 477, 103 A.2d 192 (1954). The 
mass of evidence put on by the State clearly shows 
that in addition to whatever designs the defendants 
had on the Barlow Furniture Company and the Lock-
hart Company, they also intended to commit a fel-
ony in the Clearfield State Bank. Thus, the entry of 
the Barlow Furniture Company and the Lockhart 
Company was effected as an integrated, direct, nec-
essary and immediate step in the perpetration of a 
felony. Defendants propose that the evidence show-
ing intent to "crack" the Clearfield State Bank has 
an exculpatory effect with respect to the charged 
burglary of the Barlow Furniture Company and the 
Lockhart Company. Unfortunately, perhaps, for 
them, this evidence has the opposite result. The 
great volume of affirmative evidence directly bear-
ing on the subjective intent of the appellants only 
serves to further support the jury's conclusion that 
the defendants did in fact enter with the "intent to 
commit larceny or any other felony." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-3 (1953). They are now doubly ensnared: 
The jury could reasonably infer intent from the mere 
entry State v. Tellay. supra; in addition, the jury may 
2 In this case, the court incisively analyzes the limited number of cases 
which have dealt with this exact point, concluding: "We consider the true 
rule to be that ... the intent to commit larceny or any felony is not 
confined to intent to commit the crime in the building which is entered if 
the intent at the time of entry is to commit the offense in the immediate 
vicinity of the place entered by defendant; if the entry is made as a means 
of facilitating the commission of the theft or felony; and if the two places 
are so closely connected that intent and consummation of the crime would 
constitute a single and practically continuous transaction." 206 C.A.2d at 
188, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 739. 
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also consider the direct evidence of the defendants' 
intent. In view of this, the verdict of guilty is amply 
supported by the evidence. 
However, lest the ingenious and original theory 
of defendants be overlooked, and the novel argu-
ment in support of the technical defense here sub-
mitted be ignored, respondents would submit the 
following: Assuming that the statute requires the 
intent be to commit a felony within the building 
entered, in addition to the larceny shown there is 
further proof in the record that the appellants com-
mitted another felony inside both the Barlow Furn-
iture Company and the Lockhart Company, that fel-
ony being attempted first degree burglary. This is 
so because "any act done with intent to commit a 
crime and tending but failing to affect its commis-
sion, is an attempt to commit a crime." Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-1-30 (1953). 
The defendants' acts within the Barlow Furn-
iture Company and the Lockhart Company were 
clearly acts tending but failing to affect a commis-
sion of first degree burglary. People v. Cloninger. 
165 Cal. App.2d 86, 331 P.2d 441 (1958). Thus, the acts 
done within these named buildings would consti-
tute a separate felony. From this ample evidence 
the jury could, and did, reasonably conclude that 
the defendant's entered with the intent to commit 
"larceny or any felony" therein. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respondent's contention that none of the 
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appellants' arguments herein are meritorious. It is 
clear that appellants declined an offer to remand 
for further preliminary hearing, and in so doing 
effectively waived any objection to errors which 
may have existed at that time. Appellants cannot 
now complain to this court that they were prejudic-
ed by any action at the preliminary hearing or by 
any amendment made to the information since, 
when afforded the opportunity, they apparently felt 
the problem was not so great as to warrant further 
proceedings. 
It seems incredible that appellants would come 
to this court with an avalanche of evidence 
showing that the entry of the buildings as recited in 
the information was effected with felonious intent, 
and in addition admit that the evidence is sufficient 
to convict for attempted first degree burglary (Brief 
of Appellant, p. 4), and yet submit the argument to 
this court that the evidence is insufficient to show a 
lesser included offense. With the mass of uncont-
roverted facts in the record, there is ample basis 
for the jury to conclude as they did. In view of this, 
respondent submits that the judgment and convic-
tion thereon should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
Assistant Attorney General 
